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ABSTRACT 
 
We develop an approach for the evaluation of interrelated risks that could compromise a 
pharmaceutical supply chain’s ability to serve patients, whereby experts conduct pairwise-
comparisons through an online gamification-enabled platform. Risks categorization based on 
structural modelling elevates their consideration beyond the single instance in which they are 
normally evaluated. 
 
KEYWORDS: Multi-method research, Pharmaceutical Supply Chains, Supply Risk 
Management 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The literature on risk management in supply chains has developed substantially in recent years 
demonstrating the importance of taking a systems perspective on risk. For example, since the 
seminal work of Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield (2007) increasing 
attention has been paid to the network characteristics of supply chains, and how these 
characteristics may affect system-wide disruptions. In a similar fashion, the World Economic 
Forum (2018) highlights that global risk perception should take into account how different risks 
might influence each other, as if forming a network, rather than evaluating each risk in isolation 
in terms of frequency and magnitude. Interdependencies between individual risks are 
sometimes acknowledged (for example, Chopra & Sodhi 2004), but not generally considered. 
The pharmaceutical sector provides an ideal context to address this methodological gap. 
Pharmaceutical Supply Chains (PSC) are increasingly exposed to disturbances such as the 
contamination, adulteration and substitution of pharmaceutical ingredients throughout 
increasingly global sourcing processes; the intentional and fraudulent production of drugs 
(counterfeiting); and the manifestation of arbitrage behavior through speculative inventory build-
up in secondary distribution channels (Marucheck, Greis, Mena, & Cai, 2011). Due to the 
fragmented nature of PSCs, it is not common practice to analyze the identified risks in terms of 
possible interdependencies between them. Rather, the industry’s approach to risk management 
is predominantly concerned with Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) and regulatory 
compliance (Friedli, Basu, Bellm, & Werani, 2013, p. 63). Whilst relationships between risks are 
sometimes defined in hierarchical terms as in Fault Tree Analysis (Rees, 2011, p. 403), these 
approaches lack consistent analytical counterparts. 
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Considering the above mentioned gaps, we develop an approach for identifying and evaluating 
risk interdependencies that could compromise a PSC’s ability to serve patients. This is achieved 
by answering the following research questions: 
• RQ1: How can PSC risks be categorized and prioritized while systematically taking into 
account the interdependencies between them? 
• RQ2: Which areas of interventions become more prominent when risk 
interdependencies are taken into account? 
The proposed approach is meant to inform the formulation of mitigation strategies by elevating 
the consideration of risks beyond the single instance in which they are normally assessed. 
The reminder of this paper provides an overview of the relevant academic literature; outlines 
key methodological aspects for the elicitation and analysis of expert knowledge on risk 
interdependences; and illustrates an initial implementation through a sector case study in the 
UK pharmaceutical industry. This is followed by a discussion of some preliminary findings, and 
the expert feedback on how such findings may inform a critical appraisal of current and 
perspective risk mitigation practices. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Compared to the vast academic literature on Risk Management in Supply Chains (Heckmann, 
Comes, & Nickel, 2015 provide an overview), relatively little work has investigated the nature 
and prevalence of risk in pharmaceutical supply. For example, Huq, Pawar, & Rogers (2016) 
surveyed senior PSC executives on 20 ‘disturbance factors’ in three global pharmaceutical 
network configurations differing for outsourcing location policy; Panzitta et al. (2017) propose a 
simplified risk assessment procedure to help regulators to quickly assessing medicine shortage 
risk in relation to 10 factors potentially affecting manufacturing complexity; Breen (2008) 
mapped out the PSC underpinning the UK National Health Service and identified 35 aspects of 
the current ‘state-of-the-world’ that could negatively affect the movement of medicines and 
materials, and hence compromise the treatment of patients. Jaberidoost, Nikfar, Abdollahiasl, & 
Dinarvand (2013) identify 50 vulnerability areas of a PSC by reviewing the literature. While a 
comprehensive overview of the literature is left outside the scope of this paper for brevity, it is 
possible to outline broad trends from both a conceptual and a data-driven modelling perspective: 
• From a conceptual perspective, a common trait across research carried out to date, 
regardless of specific applications to PSC, is that the emphasis is placed on identifying and 
categorizing disturbances, chiefly uncertain and adverse triggering-events and outcomes, 
which are aggregately addressed with the blanket term ‘supply chain risks’. 
• From a modeling perspective, there seems to be three incumbent perspectives on data-
driven supply chain risk management in PSC, namely: 
o Statistical inference and predictive analytics: empirical observations such as time-
series or longitudinal data are mined to detect regularities in the occurrence of specific 
events. With regards to the pharmaceutical industry, regulatory agencies provide public 
domain datasets regarding, for example, medicine shortages and recalls. The analysis 
of such data with the aim of identifying trends and developing predictive analytics has 
received little attention in academia (Aschenbrücker, Löscher, & Troppens, 2013); 
o Simulation and optimization: probabilistic and ‘snapshot’ data (i.e. not historical) 
concerning the occurrence of identified scenarios are commonly taken into account 
when optimizing supply network configuration or simulating inventory dynamics in the 
form of stochastic programming and chance constraint. Applications may include 
avoiding medicines shortage by optimizing the build-up of buffer inventory as a 
mitigation strategy. For example Bam, McLaren, Coetzee, & Von Leipzig (2017) apply 
Systems Dynamics to model shortage risk for tuberculosis medicines; 
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o Expert judgment: In the absence of precise quantitative data about specific product 
supply chains, the two approaches mentioned above cannot be applied. Often, the only 
source of empirical evidence is the expertise of those ‘in the know’, which then needs 
to be appropriately elicited and processed to provide some aid to decision making. 
Expert judgment may be elicited in the form of qualitative data, as in interviews or panel 
studies (Breen, 2008); or semi-quantitative data such as scores on ordinal scales as in 
surveys (Huq et al., 2016) and pair-wise comparisons (Raka & Liangrokapart, 2017).  
The last perspective is of particular relevance for this paper, since empirical evidence is 
gathered chiefly through expert judgment. The reason for this choice is twofold. First, the 
necessary data for simulation and optimization is often company and product-specific: while 
providing greater accuracy, this approach may limit a priori the possibility to gather a broader, 
multi-stakeholder perspective on the topic of risk in PSC. Second, most statistical datasets 
available in the public domain have geographical coverage limited to the United States, and lack 
an end-to-end supply chain perspective. Rather, these datasets focus on the occurrence and 
duration of specific events such as shortage and recall of pharmaceutical products, sometimes 
accompanied by the indication of a single cause for its occurrence (for example, ‘manufacturing 
delay’, ‘demand variability’ etc.). 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The multimethod research approach adopted in this paper for modeling PSC risk is illustrated 
schematically in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Visual summary of proposed approach 
 
 
The following sub-sections illustrate the key methodological aspects of the proposed multi-
method research approach with regards to terminology and conceptual assumptions; 
techniques for semi-quantitative analysis; and data gathering process. 
 
Theoretical perspective 
In the context of this research, the notion of PSC risk is chiefly associated with the ability or 
inability to provide patients with the ‘right’ medicines. 
While risk is relatively straightforward to formulate mathematically, it is more difficult to reach 
agreement on contextual definitions that enable the effective management of risk in supply 
chains (Kumar, Srai, & Gregory, 2016). A widespread attitude towards the concept of risk is to 
place the emphasis almost exclusively on what can go wrong, and hence on what supply chain 
organizations need to worry about (Olson & Wu, 2010). Underneath this common understanding 
of risk is the belief that unacceptable outcomes must have unacceptable causes, and that these 
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must be distinct from the causes of acceptable outcomes, thus reflecting an implicit moral codex 
in which good deeds are rewarded and bad deeds are punished (Hollnagel, 2018). This belief is 
implicitly endorsed in PSC through commonly adopted managerial practices such as root cause 
analysis – see for example Friedli et al. (2013). The main methodological implication of this 
terminological habit is that hunting for broken components within complex socio-technical 
systems continues to equate with ‘good analysis’ (Dekker, 2011). 
A more nuanced view is that undesired outcomes typically associated with the notion of ‘risk’ 
emerge from the behavior of a complex socio-technical system, hence making ‘things that go 
wrong’ hardly separable from ‘things that go well’ (Hollnagel, 2018). Fewer works have brought 
to the fore the role of structural elements reflecting the system-like nature of supply chains in 
general, and PSC in particular. For example, Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & 
Handfield (2007) associate the occurrence of supply chain disruptions, as well as the ability to 
respond to such disruptions through mitigation capabilities with structural elements of supply 
chains across several industries, including pharmaceutical, such as density, complexity, and 
node criticality. 
The terminological caveats examined above lead to the following conceptual assumptions, 
which are adopted henceforth: 
1. The term ‘risk’ more appropriately describes the exposure to the chance of loss or gain 
by choice rather than fate: in this way the attention is shifted towards managerial aspects 
for which decision support tools are needed (Emblemsvåg, 2011); 
2. Supply chains being complex socio-technical systems (Pathak, Day, Nair, Sawaya, & 
Kristal, 2007), focusing on linear cause-effect relationships to understand adverse and 
disruptive outcomes can be misleading. Rather, it is necessary to pay greater attention 
to both the relevant system’s elements, and the contextual relations among them; 
3. Higher-order interactions between ill-defined elements of a complex system are difficult 
to grasp relying on the individual’s bounded rationality. To explore these interactions, 
experts need to sharpen their perception of the relationships between the system’s 
elements through a formalized structure (Bolaños, Fontela, Nenclares, & Pastor, 2005). 
 
Techniques for semi-quantitative analysis 
The theoretical perspective presented above is addressed here through Structural Modeling 
(SM). A common principle across various SM techniques is to enable a group of experts to 
formally articulate an ill-defined problem in terms of elements and relationships within a system 
using the principles of graph theory, while allowing each expert to contribute diverse data, skill, 
and knowledge – see Lendaris (1980) for a comparative overview. 
Specifically, two closely related techniques will be considered here:  
• the structural problematique analysis developed within the DEMATEL (Decision Making 
Trial and Evaluation Laboratory) project (Fontela & Gabus, 1974), and  
• the MICMAC (Matrice d’Impacts Croisés-Multiplication Appliquée à un Classement) 
technique (Godet, 1977). 
Both approaches take inexact, subjective inputs with the aim of producing a meaningful, but not 
precise output by ranking, categorizing, and visualizing the elements included in the system of 
interest based on how they relate to each other. In both cases, the system’s elements are 
typically qualitative structural variables of memory and experience, anticipation and foresight, or 
needs and goals; the relationships between such elements are typically relational statements 
can be definitive, comparative, influential, or mathematical in nature. 
The key difference between MICMAC and DEMATEL is in the classification/prioritization and 
visualization of the elements of the system based on their interrelationships. In particular: 
• Visualization facilities: both MICMAC and DEMATEL generate classification planes with 
specific interpretations for different areas of the plane; 
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• Computational structure: DEMATEL is based on solving a convergent series the elements 
of which are powers of a normalized cross-impact matrix. Conversely, MICMAC is based on 
raising a cross-impact matrix to consecutive powers following specific stopping criteria; 
• Procedural consistency: DEMATEL is probably the approach more accurately described 
since the outset from a computational perspective. The consistent application of MICMAC is 
difficult to verify, as most works in the literature do not disclose the analytical details of the 
steps followed (see for example Jain, Kumar, Soni, & Chandra, 2017). 
• Synthesis of multiple responses: DEMATEL explicitly provides analytical devices to 
combine multiple responses obtained from different experts, and to deal with the 
uncertainty deriving from such variety. In principle, also MIMAC and ISM may involve 
multiple experts, but it is unclear how this is analytically taken into account. 
Based on our literature review, neither DEMATEL nor MICMAC have been applied to evaluate 
risk interdependencies in PSC. While System Dynamics qualifies as an SM tool (Lendaris, 
1980), its applications to PSC are either product-specific (Bam et al., 2017), or purely schematic 
representations of causal paths and feedback loops (Narayana, Arun, & Rupesh, 2014). 
 
Data gathering process 
The identification of relevant risks with specific regards to the PSC was carried out through an 
iterative process involving multi-stakeholder workshops; qualitative data analyses through text 
mining; and online collection of semi-quantitative data (ordered-category rating items) through 
gamification-enabled structural modelling. Workshops were deemed a suitable format to gather 
reliable data through the active participation of a selected group of individuals sharing common 
expertise in the domain of interest (Ørngreen & Levinsen, 2017). 
The steps of the knowledge elicitation process can be summarized as follows: 
• Identification of risk elements to generate a ‘risk universe’ for a generalized PSC using a 
standardized PSC configuration map (Srai & Gregory, 2008) within a semi-structured 
workshop process involving input from multiple experts with extensive experience on risk 
analysis across the sector. Experts included individuals from two of the largest UK-based 
medicine manufacturers; a leading specialist healthcare distribution logistics providers; 
the major pharmacy retailer in the UK; a healthcare consultancy practice providing 
analytical tools for risk management; and a financial institution specializing in 
pharmaceutical risk insurance and reinsurance. 
• Over 120 hours of expert deliberations on risk events informed the development of a 
‘universe’ or risks, generating 121 risk items (statements) across the end-to-end PSC. In 
line with the incumbent risk management practice and academic literature alike, the risk 
universe thus obtained represented a comprehensive list of ‘things that can go wrong’ in 
a PSC, each accompanied by a definition and supporting statement of possible root 
causes. The potential relationships between these items were not identified at this stage; 
• Textual data analysis: standard text mining techniques (Provost & Fawcett, 2013 Ch.10) 
were deployed to evaluate wording similarity and discover possible latent topics across 
items included in the workshop’s risk universe, as well as in relation to 13 similar lists 
published in the academic literature. Through multiple iterations informed by the text 
mining results, 74 risk items aggregated in 17 categories were selected as elements of 
the system of interest to be further analyzed through SM. The items and categories 
included in this subset of the risk universe are listed in the Appendix; 
• Pair-wise comparison of selected risk item: a second data-gathering process involved a 
group of five experts representing primary and secondary manufacturing; distribution and 
retail pharmacy, and institutional sector risk consultancy. The experts were required to 
provide 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑛𝑛(𝑛𝑛− 1) scores on a scale from 0 [no influence] to 5 [very strong influence], 
were 𝑛𝑛 = 74 is the number of risks included in the final list. A gamification-enabled online 
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platform for structural modelling (MATRisk: https://remedies-ifm.azurewebsites.net/) was 
specifically developed to enable the assessment of the level of interdependence 
between risks by pair-wise comparison.  
Elements of gamification were specifically introduced to incentivize users to engage in the 
process of collecting data of greater quantity and quality (Seaborn & Fels, 2015). In particular, 
through the online platform, each respondent scored remotely and in their own time the 𝑵𝑵 pairs 
of risk items. Each pair was presented on screen as a ‘card’ containing an iconic representation 
and textual description of each item. The pairwise comparisons between these items was 
operated either by simply ‘swiping left’ to indicate that no association between the items exists, 
or ‘swiping right’ otherwise – in which case the respondent is asked to score the magnitude of 
the association on a 5-point ordinal scale. To expedite the process, experts could swipe groups 
of items simultaneously by using top-level cards corresponding to the 17 categories previously 
identified. The second process step in Figure 1 provides an iconic representation of the 
proposed gamification-enabled pair-wise comparison. 
The preliminary data gathered process was carried out over 20 days throughout April 2018, 
following a webinar organized by the researchers to illustrate the purpose and use of the online 
platform to the enrolled respondents. At the end of the time window, data was gathered in the 
form of cross-impact matrices, analyzed by the researchers and the results presented to the 
respondents for feedback in a follow-up validation workshop. 
 
RELIMINARY FINDINGS 
To address RQ1 and RQ2, this section provides insights into the process of generating a 
classification and prioritization of PSC risks from experts-generated interdependencies scores. 
For the sake of clarity, the analysis is illustrated through a streamlined example first, and later 
on applied to actual data obtained from one respondent through the MATRisk online platform. 
For illustration, assume the risk universe consist of 7 items; then a hypothetical expert response 
corresponds to a 7 × 7 cross-impact matrix 𝐗𝐗 like the one depicted in Table 1. (An actual table 
gathered through MATRisk would have 74 × 74 = 5,476 cells: due to space limitations, such 
table is not reported in full here, but is available from the authors on request) 
 
Table 1: Hypothetical response numerical example: values are randomly generated for 
illustrative purposes only 
EXP Influencing risk item Influenced risk item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A 1 Critical findings during Quality Audit 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
D 2 Process variability and quality deviation 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 
A 3 Final product contamination/degradation 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
B 4 Supplier's understanding of regulatory constraints 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 5 Strategic/commercial decision by supplier to discontinue product 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
B 6 Lack of process robustness/process failure/variability of product 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 
E 7 Shelf life insufficient for product lifetime/distribution timescales 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EXP: expert classification by cause/responsibility (A - Failure in Focal Company Quality; B - Failure in Contract 
Manufacturer quality; C - Inability of supply; D - Process complexity/variability; E - Regulatory Change); 
 
Table 1 shows an example of how most SM techniques, such as DEMATEL and MICMAC, 
formally articulate the relationships of direct influence between any pair of constituting parts of 
the problem situation. Each cell in the cross-impact matrix records the expert’s assessment of 
the influence of the item listed row-wise on the item listed column-wise. Hence, the generic 
element of a cross-impact matrix 𝐗𝐗 can be interpreted as follows: 
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𝐗𝐗 = �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � = � 𝑙𝑙, expert k believes that i exerts direct influence of magnitude l on j 0, otherwise  (1) 
In equation (1), each row and column of 𝐗𝐗 (hence, each risk item) is indexed as i and j, 
respectively. The estimate 𝑙𝑙 of the magnitude of a relationship between elements of a problem 
situation is typically expressed using ordered-category rating items. Unfortunately, there is no 
consistent use of rating items in the literature. Depending on the individual study, the rating 
items range from [0, 1], indicating just the absence/presence of an influential relationship (see 
for example Jain et al., 2017), and up to 5-points ordered-category rating items to indicate very 
low [1] to very high [5] influence (see for example Rajesh & Ravi, 2017). The latter type of rating 
item is not be confused with Likert-type scales used in survey research, since it lacks the 
characteristic of being a bipolar and symmetrically balanced response set, and it is not meant to 
indicate degree of agreement with a stimulus attitude statement. 
For example, 𝑥𝑥2,5 = 2 denotes that, in the expert’s opinion there is a direct influence between 
risk item 002 (‘Process variability and quality deviations’) and risk item 005 
(‘Strategic/commercial decision by supplier to discontinue product’). While this is not the case 
the other way round, since 𝑥𝑥5,2 = 0. Mutual influences are allowed, but the relationship is not 
symmetrical i.e., ‘A influences B’ does not imply that ‘B influences A’. In terms of the MATRisk 
online platform usage, this means that the respondent has ‘swiped right’ when presented with a 
the pairwise comparison card stating ‘Risk item 002 influences risk item 005’, but they ‘swiped 
left’ when presented with the card stating the relationship the other way round. Consequently, 
along any row of matrix 𝐗𝐗 one reads the direct influence exerted by the corresponding risk item 
on any other item; along any column, one reads the dependence of the corresponding risk item 
on any other item. In the example, item 002 directly influences items 005 and 006 (‘Lack of 
process robustness/process failure/variability of product’); and it directly depends on items 005, 
hence 002 and 005 are said to form a cycle. Matrix 𝐗𝐗 can, in fact, be interpreted as the 
incidence matrix of a weighted directed graph. For an actual response, Figure 2 shows the 
network visualization and descriptive analysis generated using Gephi (Bastian, Heymann, & 
Jacomy, 2009).  
The use of graph-theory to interpret the cross-impact matrix 𝐗𝐗 is a key principle of SM in general 
(Lendaris, 1980), and of techniques such as MICMAC and DEMATEL in particular. Both 
techniques take 𝐗𝐗 as input, but then process it in a slightly different fashion: 
According to the MIMAC technique, 𝐗𝐗 is raised to successive powers 𝑝𝑝 = 2,3, … to unravel paths 
of influence beyond the direct connections represented in the corresponding graph. For 
example, making reference to the hypothetical example in Table 1, risk item 002 does not exert 
a direct influence on item 003 (“Final product contamination/degradation”) but it does so 
indirectly through item 006, which it directly influences and, in turn, influences item 003. This is 
known as transitivity. This path can be discovered through the Boolean operation of raising 𝐗𝐗 to 
the power 𝑝𝑝 = 2, and checking that 𝑥𝑥2,3(2) ≠ 0 – here the notation 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖(2) denotes the element in row 
𝑖𝑖 and column 𝑗𝑗 in the Boolean matrix associated with 𝐗𝐗2, not �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�
2
. This leads to the following 
general formulation: 
𝐓𝐓∗ = 𝜆𝜆𝐗𝐗𝑝𝑝∗  (2) 
Where 𝐓𝐓∗ is the normalized matrix of total connections, 𝑝𝑝∗ is the highest power to which matrix 
𝐗𝐗 is raised; and 𝜆𝜆 is a normalization factor. Unfortunately, there is no agreement in the literature 
with regards to the parameters 𝜆𝜆 and 𝑝𝑝∗. 
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Figure 2 Network visualization, descriptive analysis of initial response (risks list in Appendix) 
 
Netw ork summary: 
• Avg. degree: 5.9 
• N = 74; L: = 443 
• Density: 0.08 
• Avg. path length: 4.12 
 
• Arcs color-coding: weight (the 
higher the score the darker the 
arc color) 
• Nodes color-coding: 
categorization in risk universe 
 
For example, Godet (2007) suggests that 𝑝𝑝∗ is such that greater powers no longer affect the 
ranking of the vector sums across the columns and rows of 𝐓𝐓∗, whereas Lendaris (1980) implies 
that 𝑝𝑝∗ = 𝑛𝑛; in either case 𝜆𝜆 = 1. Conversely, (Hachicha & Elmsalmi, 2014) use  𝜆𝜆 = 10−𝑝𝑝∗+1 
but do not provide a general rule. Other applications do not disclose the computational 
procedure followed in implementing MICMAC. In the simplified example considered here, 𝑝𝑝∗ = 4 
is found iteratively. It follows that  𝜆𝜆 = 10−3 and: 
 
𝐓𝐓∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.625 0 0.025 0 0 0 0.2500.500 0.225 0.300 0 0 0 00.625 0 0 0 0 0 0.1250.075 0 0.075 0 0 0 0.3750 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0.100 0 0.090 0.225 0.8000.125 0 0.125 0 0 0 0.625⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
; 𝐝𝐝∗ = 𝟏𝟏′𝐓𝐓∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1.950.220.6200.090.222.17⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
; 𝐫𝐫∗ = 𝐓𝐓∗𝟏𝟏 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
0.901.020.750.5201.210.87⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
′
 
 
Vectors 𝐝𝐝∗ and 𝐫𝐫∗ are obtained, respectively, as the column and row sums of 𝐓𝐓∗, providing for 
each item in Table 1 a measure of its overall power of influencing or being influenced, directly 
and indirectly, by any other items. The elements in 𝐝𝐝∗ and 𝐫𝐫∗ that correspond to a specific risk 
item are used as coordinates to graphically represent the item on a Cartesian plane. For an 
actual respondent, Figure 3 (next page) shows the risk items scatterplot on the 
influence/dependence plane. 
In Figure 3 the risk items are categorized as they fall into specific quadrants of the plane based 
on whether their coordinates are above or below the average dependence and influence. 
Proceeding clockwise, each quadrant is interpreted as follows (Godet, 2007): 
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Figure 3 MICMAC risk categorization for initial response (risks list in Appendix) 
 
 
• Quadrant I (upper-left): mostly influential items, potentially conditioning and explaining the 
behavior of the whole system; 
• Quadrant II (upper right): gate-keeping or ‘relay’ items showing instability, characterized by 
being both influential and dependent on other items in the system; 
• Quadrant III (lower right):mostly dependent items, largely resulting from the interactions 
between those items in quadrants I and II; 
• Quadrant IV (lower left): mostly autonomous items, that may be expected to have little or no 
influence on future developments having fewer relationships with the rest of the system. 
These can be safely discarded from further analysis. 
The segments corresponding to each quadrant are visually codified as shapes in Figure 3. 
The same matrix-structured dataset gathered through the MATRisk app was analyzed through 
the DEMATEL technique. A distinguishing feature of DEMATEL is that the total connections 
matrix 𝐓𝐓∗ is the result of a convergent series, the element of which are powers of a normalized 
cross-impact matrix 𝐀𝐀 obtained by multiplying the raw data gathered in 𝐗𝐗 by a scalar equal to 
the reciprocal of the largest row sum of the cross-impact matrix (Fontela & Gabus, 1974): 
𝐓𝐓∗ = lim
𝑝𝑝→∞
�𝐀𝐀 +𝐀𝐀2 +𝐀𝐀3 +⋯+𝐀𝐀𝑝𝑝� =𝐀𝐀�𝐈𝐈 −𝐀𝐀�−1 (3) 
Settanni, et al. Risk interdependencies in pharmaceutical supply chains 
 
 
 
Figure 4 DEMATEL risk categorization of initial response (risks list in Appendix) 
 
 
In equation (3), 𝐈𝐈 is an identity matrix of adequate size, and the superscript “-1” denotes matrix 
inversion. The aspects of normalization and convergence criteria when computing the total 
connection matrix as shown in equation (3) are less ambiguous in the literature than in the 
MICMAC case. As in the MICMAC case, the key metrics of dependence and influence are 
obtained by summing the elements of the total row and column-wise, respectively. Using the 
simplified example in Table 1, from equation (3) one obtains: 
 
𝐓𝐓∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
1.39 0 0.34 0 0 0 1.950.71 0.44 0.69 0 0.41 1.20 1.011.22 0 0.17 0 0 0 1.711.02 0 0.14 0 0 0 0.830 0 0 0 0 0 01.01 0.61 0.96 0 0.17 0.44 1.411.71 0 0.24 0 0 0 1.39⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
; 𝐝𝐝∗ = 𝟏𝟏′𝐓𝐓∗ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
7.091.062.5700.581.478.32⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
′
; 𝐫𝐫∗ = 𝐓𝐓∗𝟏𝟏 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
3.694.303.122.0104.623.36⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
The elements are visualised and categorized by combining the corresponding values in vectors 
𝐝𝐝∗ and 𝐫𝐫∗ as follows: 
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o 𝐲𝐲 = 𝐫𝐫∗ − 𝐝𝐝∗: is the “net position” of the risk items. A positive entry in 𝐲𝐲, indicates that the 
corresponding risk item is predominantly a “dispatcher”, strongly influencing other risks. 
Whereas, if negative the item is predominantly a “receiver”, strongly influenced by other risks. 
o 𝐱𝐱 = 𝐝𝐝∗ + 𝐫𝐫∗: is the “total intensity” of the risk items. Similarly to the concept of weighted node 
degree in a network, larger-valued entries in 𝐱𝐱 denote risk items of greater overall relevance, 
considered simultaneously as a dispatcher and receiver. 
With reference to the data gathered for an actual respondent, Figure 4 (above) shows an 
alternative scatterplot of the same risk items according to their net position and total intensity 
indicators computed according to the DEMATEL procedure described above. In Figure 4, risks 
regarded as endogenous and environmental are shown with total intensity increasing from right 
to left (greyed area), whereas risks regarded as exogenous to the individual firm but 
endogenous to the PSC are shown with total intensity increasing form left to right. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Although derived from a limited respondent base, the results illustrated in the previous section 
already provide some structural insights into the propagation of risks in a generalised PSC when 
possible interdependencies between risks are explicitly taken into account. 
Joint examination of Figures 3 and 4 leads to the following observations: 
• Dependent risks (items falling in Quadrant III of Figure 3; bottom half of Figure 4) are mostly 
located downstream, reflecting a linear upstream-to-downstream flow of influence. For 
example, almost all the risk items included in the category “downstream engagement and 
demand fulfilment” exhibit high dependency (bottom-right quadrant in Figure 3; and bottom 
half of Figure 4). Most of these items are perfectly dependent (nil influence). Those items that 
more closely reflect the overarching PSC risk concept defined in the theoretical perspective 
section, namely R046 (“Product shortage prevents patient getting product”) and R040 
(“Delays in delivery to patient”), exhibit the highest dependence in Figure 3. Whilst these 
items are still prominent in Figure 4, risks belonging to other categories, namely R008 (“Late 
or incorrect delivery of materials “”) and R064 (“Loss of license to operate”) exhibit higher 
rank in terms of receiver net position and intensity; 
• Influential risks (items falling in Quadrant I of Figure 3; upper half of Figure 4) belong to 
heterogeneous categories. The highest ranking risk in this segment, R033, is technological in 
nature and related to the increasing complexity of medicines portfolios. Most 
contractual/regulatory compliance risks, and risks in the category “responsiveness to 
catastrophic and extreme events” fall in this segment (upper-left quadrant in Figure 3; upper 
half of Figure 4); 
• Relay (unstable) risks (Quadrant III in Figure 3; middle-right/left in Figure 4): the presence of 
seven items in the upper-right quadrant in Figure 3 suggests some instability in the system, 
although none of these items scores simultaneously as high in influence and dependence. 
Relay items are either endogenous to the firm or environmental in nature, including 
categories such as: process complexity/variability; forecast accuracy; and inability of supply; 
• Ambiguous risks: some risks are located in close proximity to the x or y-axis in Figure 3, such 
as R067 (“Failure/inability to comply with regulatory change”) and R072 (“Product diversion 
e.g. product not being sold in target market in the presence of price differentials”). These 
risks are more difficult to categorize and require further analysis (Godet, 2007). 
• Independent risks (Quadrant IV in Figure 3; close to the centre in Figure 4): Almost half 
(~46%) of the risk items evaluated falls into the “autonomous” category and hence could be 
dismissed, as they exhibit weak influence and dependence. For example, two downstream 
risks have neutral net position, with R045 (“Extended applicability of GDP to handling points 
in the distribution chain”) being perfectly autonomous (graphically positioned at the point of 
origin in Figure 3 and 4; and a disconnected node in Figure 2).While relevant in terms of risk 
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identification, these risks might not propagate as pervasively as others, rather, they can be 
regarded as mostly self-contained and hence not a priority. 
Preliminary findings such as those discussed above provided the grounds for an expert-panel 
discussion in a follow-up workshop. Visual analytics analogous to those shown in Figure 3 and 4 
were presented to the participants through interactive dashboards on multi-user touch-screen 
surfaces to enable further interrogation and exploration of the data as part of a small-group 
learning activity. 
From a mitigation strategy perspective, the analysis lends itself to network theories on 
contractual relationships and their implications for supply chain management (Kim, Choi, Yan, & 
Dooley, 2011). More specifically, proposed risk management for networked risks (54% of those 
identified in our study) would be informed by the identification of influential, informational 
dependent, and relational mediation characteristics of risks. For independent risks (46% in our 
study) conventional approaches to manage and mitigate risk such as those prosed by Chopra & 
Sodhi (2004) and Kumar et al. (2016) would remain appropriate and relevant. 
From a computational standpoint, similarities and differences between MICMAC and DEMATEL 
and the visual-analytical insights they generate are rarely pointed out. Rather, either technique 
is chosen upfront by individual studies without acknowledging the other. This reflects a more 
general lack of comparative research on SM approach since seminal works such as Lendaris 
(1980). For similar reasons, only few works to date address the issue of assessing the reliability 
and validity of the results obtained through these techniques (e.g., Shieh & Wu, 2016). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has presented an approach for the evaluation of interrelated risks that could 
compromise a pharmaceutical supply chain’s ability to serve patients. The approach was 
developed in line with multi-method research, and it encompassed the elicitation of expert 
knowledge on risk events across the PSC; the development of an online gamification-enabled 
platform for experts to conduct pairwise-comparisons; and the use of structural analysis 
methods to categorize and prioritize risks based on their identified interrelationships. These 
steps have been illustrated throughout the paper with reference to some preliminary results 
gathered from actual survey responses with a focus on the UK pharmaceutical landscape.  
Feedback and validation of preliminary findings through industry experts’ engagement confirm 
the utility of the approach in determining risk category clusters where interdependencies elevate 
their consideration beyond the single instance in which they are normally evaluated. 
While existing techniques are employed as part of the proposed approach, its novelty lies in the 
broader process of expert judgement elicitation, from the identification of a sector-specific 
universe of risks, through to the analytical evaluation of the possible interdependencies between 
the identified risks, and up to bringing the analytical insights gathered from individual 
respondents back to the group for discussion and validation.  
The proposed approach promotes the innovative use of gamification-enabled structural 
modelling, thus explicitly addressing the challenges of engaging experts in a potentially 
cumbersome data gathering process. The panel discussion provided initial feedback on the 
respondents’ overall experience with the data gathering process, visualisation of results insights 
on ranking. Overall, the MATRisk app was found to be easy to use, and serving its purpose of 
expediting a comparison process potentially involving 5,000+ pairs of items. 
An obvious limitation of the research presented in this paper is that it relies on preliminary 
results gathered from a limited set of respondents. However, similar works often present 
aggregated view through a single super-respondent, or are vague with regards to whether 
single or multiple experts are involved in a study. Other limitations include the absence of a 
consistent approach on assessing the reliability and validity of the results obtained through SM 
techniques. Addressing these limitations calls for further research on this topic. 
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APPENDIX – LIST OF RISK ITEMS EVALUATED THROUGH THE MATRisk APP 
Item * Category (based on text analysis and 
judgment) 
Top-level classification (literature) 
R001, R002, R003, R004 Adequacy of supply base Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R005, R006, R007, R008, R009, R010 Continuity and acceptability of supply Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R011, R012, R013 Dependability of upstream 
assets/infrastructures 
Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R014, R015, R016, R017 Adherence to procedures and protocols 
upstream 
Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R018, R019, R020, R021, R022 Effectiveness and eff icacy of production Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R023, R024, R025, R026, R027 Dependability of assets/infrastructure Endogenous 
R028, R029, R030 Adherence to internal procedures and policies Endogenous 
R031, R032, R033, R034 Technological capacity, agility and f lexibility in 
manufacturing 
Endogenous 
R035, R036 Forecasts accuracy Endogenous 
R037, R038, R039 Inventory visibility and traceability Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R040, R041, R042, R043, R044, R045, R046 Dow nstream engagement and demand 
fulf ilment 
Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R047, R048, R049, R050, R051 Dependability of dow nstream 
assets/infrastructures 
Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R052, R053, R054, R055, R056, R057 Adherence to procedures and protocols 
dow nstream 
Exogenous to the f irm, endogenous 
to the netw ork 
R058, R059, R060, R061 Responsiveness to extreme and catastrophic 
events 
Environmental 
R062, R063 Socially responsible business behaviour Environmental 
R064, R065, R066, R067, R068, R069, R070 Contractual and regulatory compliance Environmental 
R071, R072, R073, R074 Aw areness of markets dynamics and 
competition 
Environmental 
*Full description omitted due to space constraints. Details available on request. 
 
